Economic interests, the influence of economic ideas and politics have been put forward in the literature as explanations for the British Repeal of the Corn Laws in 1846. In this paper, we will evaluate these competing explanations using the case of the liberalization of Belgian corn tariffs. The
The British Repeal puzzle and the Belgian case
The 1846 Repeal of the Corn Laws in Great Britain was a fascinating political event generating an impressive amount of historical and political studies. 3 The explanation of this famous episode of British political and economic history is still a moot point in present day literature on the subject. The
Corn Laws were repealed in 1846 by a conservative government that was backed by a sound majority of conservatives and aristocratic landowners in Parliament. Repeal therefore seemingly eludes standard theoretical accounts of the formation of commercial policy, that puts political survival, pressure groups and the median voter at centre stage. were nothing more than the execution of that principle. According to Grampp both Tories and Whigs were convinced that free trade would increase per capita real income. 6 Charles Kindleberger, in turn, found that all European governments used free trade as a reaction to different stimuli between 1820
and 1870, while after 1873 they all reacted differently to the same stimuli (the industrial crisis and the agricultural invasion). He therefore contended that around 1850 the countries of Europe "moved to free trade for ideological or perhaps better doctrinal reasons." 7 Douglas Irwin maintained that since Prime Minister Robert Peel had a pivotal role in Repeal, his sympathy for political economy made economic ideas important for Repeal itself. McLean and Bustani measured the influence of interests and ideology (defined as an attitude towards religion) on the voting behavior of the conservatives. They concluded that interests were important, but ideology was more important. They pointed in particular to the role of Peel, who had lost faith in the Corn Laws and used the Irish famine as a political strategy to change the Corn Laws issue from a purely economic one to politics.
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In a series of recent publications Cheryl Schonhardt-Bailey regenerated an explanation of Repeal in terms of public choice. First, she rightly showed that the changes in British economic structure also influenced the stakes for the landowners. The capital portfolios of the landed elite were diversified by investments in industry, lessening their penchant for protectionism. 11 Next, Schonhardt-Bailey attempted to measure the combined effects of interest, party affiliation and MPs' personal ideology in a single model. Based on this analysis Schonhardt-Bailey presented the Conservative party as a coalition between two interest-based alliances, with a shared concern for retaining protectionism.
Non-Peelite Conservatives mostly represented agricultural districts and had no incentive to follow Peel's move for Repeal. The Peelites represented districts with comparatively more free-trade leaning interests. Before 1846, Peelites voted according to a general Conservative protectionist ideology, but in 1846 they were set free by Peel to follow the median voter of their district who was leaning towards free trade. 12 Thus it was not ideology that made Repeal possible, but rather the liberation from ideology.
In this paper we evaluate the adequacy of economic interests to explain the liberalization of agricultural trade in the middle of the nineteenth century, using the Belgian case. In section 2 we will first review the development of Belgian tariffs for corn between 1834 and the step to complete free trade in corn in 1873. In section 3 we will present the econometric analysis of representatives' voting behavior. In section 4 we will point out the working of ideas in the evolution towards free trade. this time the prices of wheat and rye had once more descended to alarming levels that pushed the agricultural protectionists into action. The Parliamentary commission studying the bill argued that agriculture should receive protection as long as industry remained guarded from competition.
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During the lengthy discussions in the House of Representatives that led to the law of 22 February 1850, it was decided that this law would become definitive. The tariff for wheat was brought to 1 BEF per 100 kg, the equivalent of a duty of 4,8% ad valorem for the average price of 1850.
The law of 22 February 1850 can be characterized as a mixed triumph. It meant the end of the sliding scale of 1834 and is therefore the equivalent of British Repeal. Yet many representatives that had argued in favor of free trade during the discussions voted against the law because they thought that the tariff of 1 BEF was too high. Many protectionists also voted against because they hoped for the return of a protectionist sliding scale.
Belgian agricultural tariff history becomes even more complicated as the "permanent" law of 1850 did not last long. A new subsistence crisis struck between 1853 and 1857. Prices soared because of bad harvests from 1853 to 1855 and difficulties with the imports of foodstuffs during the Crimean War (1854-1856). Prices even rose above the level of 1845-1848. 28 The government reverted to the typical temporary crisis measures of free imports and export prohibition in yearly renewable laws. 25 When meeting Richard Cobden in Berlin on 29 July 1847, the Belgian ambassador Jean-Baptiste Nothomb, who was previously a cabinet minister, described Rogier as a free-trader. 
An econometric analysis of representatives' voting behavior
Our empirical analysis seeks to quantify and disentangle the relative importance of personal economic interests, party affiliation and the economic interests of the constituency for representatives' votes on the Belgian corn laws in the period 1834-1873. We study the voting behavior on five laws: the sliding scale law of 1834, the law of famine of 1845, the Repeal law of 1850, the law that lowered the tariff to 0,5 BEF in 1857 and the removal of all remaining tariffs in 1873. 31 The first four roll-call votes will be analyzed quantitatively. Because the removal tariffs in 1873 was unanimous, it is analyzed qualitatively in section 4. 
Data
The votes of the MPs in the roll-call votes are collected in the published Parliamentary procedures.
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Only effective votes are considered while the abstentions are disregarded. Table 1 shows the percentages of votes, party affiliation and personal interests in the votes under consideration.
The party affiliations of the MPs were collected from several published prosopographies of the members of Belgian Parliament. This information has never been used for a quantitative analysis before. 35 Party formation in Belgium was mostly based on the opposition between Catholics and Liberals about the role of the church and religion in public life. 36 Party affiliation is represented by three dummy variables: "cath", "lib" and "union". The first two dummies stand for the respective attachment to the Catholic and Liberal party. "Union" stands for a political current of Unionists, which aimed at underlining the political unity of Belgium in the first years of independence. The current is of limited importance for our analysis (6 votes in 1834, 2 in 1845) and ceased to exist as 32 1) Vote on 21 July 1834: Moniteur Belge. The constituencies are described economically and demographically by data for the year 1846. 41 The sources and definitions of all constituency variables are discussed extensively in the appendix. The population and industrial censuses of 1846 allow us to capture the urbanization (the share of the population living in cities) and industrialization of the constituencies. The general demographic structure of the constituency is captured by its surface ("surface") and population ("population"), the ratio of which constitutes the population density ("popdensity"). The variables "needyrel" and We employ the agricultural census to identify the agricultural orientation of each constituency. We know the percentage of the agricultural surface used for growing wheat and rye ("wheatryerel") and potatoes ("potatoerel"). We also know the number of "livestock" (dairy cows of more than 2 years old and pigs older than 2 months), the percentage of agricultural land owned by the farmers who work it ("propratio", as opposed to leasing) and the percentage of farms working a surface of more 41 The economic and demographic structure did not change too much in slightly more than a decade before and after that date (votes analyzed quantitatively in 1834, 1845, 1850 and 1857). 42 Witte, Craeybeckx and Meynen, Political History of Belgium, p. 43 and Van Eenoo, "De evolutie van de kieswetgeving in België," p. 336.
than 10 hectares ("surfmagn"). We expect representatives from constituencies with a specialization in wheat and rye production to be more in favor of agricultural protection. We also expect more support for protectionist measures where more land is leased by farmers, as large landowners would then lobby for protectionism to raise their incomes from leasing out land. The preference of districts specializing in livestock is harder to predict: as consumers of cereals they gain from lower cereal prices, but the laws under consideration in 1850 and 1857 also incorporated the tariffs for livestock. Table 2 depicts the summary statistics of these variables. Table 3 depicts the correlation matrix. Note how population density correlates positively with the percentage of the population living in cities and the orientation of agriculture towards cereal and potato production. More densely populated constituencies also tend to have a lesser share of land owned by the farmers and of farms working more than 10 hectares of land. The percentages of population and voters living in cities are almost perfectly correlated, so much so that we only employ the latter. The share of the population enrolled as needy is positively correlated with the importance of cereals and potatoes in the constituency's agriculture, which is largely due to the year of the data collection in 1846, at the height of the subsistence crisis.
General analysis
After omitting nine abstentions in the 1850 vote and seventeen in the 1857 vote, the roll-call votes of 1834, 1845, 1850 and 1857 can be analyzed as a binary variable. 43 We apply probit analysis to each vote separately to allow for maximal flexibility and account for differences in the content of the laws.
General differences in historical circumstances are, as far as they are orthogonal to our variables, absorbed into the constants of the regressions. Table 4 presents the marginal effects, at the mean, of the probit regression. These marginal effects represent the change in the probability of a vote for trade liberalization due to a unit increase in the relevant variable (at the mean), while all other variables are kept constant at the mean. For dummy variables this unit increase is a dummy change of 0 to 1 (i.e. the representative changing membership from the reference group to the group indicated by the dummy), and for logarithmic variables it concerns a 1% change. Personal economic background, captured by the first three variables, only affects voting in a way statistically different from zero in the 1857 vote. Representatives with industrial interests are, all other things being kept equal at the mean, 41% more likely to vote for liberalization in the 1857 vote than great landowners (39% if they are also great landowners). In the other votes, the statistical significance is smaller, but the sign of the effect of personal background is similar. 44 Party affiliation is, except for the 1857 vote in which both the Catholic and Liberal parties were divided, the most important variable in terms of size and statistical significance. All other things being kept constant at the mean, a Liberal representative was in 1834, 1845 and 1850 respectively 60%, 52% and 77% more likely to support agricultural trade liberalization than a Catholic representative. The few Unionist representatives were rather opposed to protectionism.
As for the constituency background, as expected, the share of agricultural land owned by the farmers increases the probability of a vote for trade liberalization in a way statistically different from zero in 44 The fact that personal interests were not decisive is obvious since otherwise no agricultural free trade bill could have made it through the Senate, which was completely dominated by the landed interests. However, the bills of 1850, 1857 and 1873 did pass. Van Dijck maintains that the Senate, which was composed of rich landowners precisely to guarantee an independent reflection on the laws passed by the more democratic House of Representatives, could not vote against agricultural free trade because an overtly self-interested vote by the Senate would compromise this institution. Van Dijck, De wetenschap van de wetgever, p. 378. 
Additional analysis of the votes in 1850 and 1857
As already mentioned, the vote on the law of 22 February 1850 was a compromise between the protectionists and the free traders that was not completely acceptable for all parties. A number of radical free trade supporters and protectionists rejected the compromise, influencing the results of our analysis of the 1850-vote. Therefore our analysis of 1850 is complemented here with a review of the votes on three amendments to the bill, during which the whole spectrum of preferences was served (1,5 BEF) (respectively 2,4%, 4,8% and 7,2% expressed ad valorem in prices of 1850). 46 The marginal effects at the mean of an ordered probit analysis of the votes on the amendments to the 1850 bill are presented in table 5. Contrary to the vote on the final compromise, personal economic background did affect voting behavior on the amendments. All other things being kept constant at the mean, representatives with only industrial interests are 32% less likely to vote for the protectionist amendment and 27% more likely to prefer the 0,5 BEF amendment than the landowners. Representatives with a professional background show a similar but less outspoken (not statistically different from 0) preference.
Representatives with a mixed background in land and industry are significantly more likely than representatives with an exclusive landownership background to prefer the protectionist option. The importance of both the production of wheat and rye and of livestock in the constituencies still proves to be an important factor in predicting preferences for the protectionist above the middle and liberalization amendments. As before, party affiliation has the most outspoken and significant effect:
Liberal representatives are 56% less likely to vote for the protectionist option, and respectively 37% and 19% more likely to vote for the middle and liberalization options than Catholic representatives.
The ordered probit on the amendments allows one to conclude that the underlying variables still work in the same direction in 1850 as they did in 1834 and 1845. However, during the voting on the amendments in 1850 the representatives had more room to take their personal interests into account. This leaves, then, the vote in 1857 as an apparent enigma. The strongest variable of the previous years, party affiliation, stopped functioning in 1857. While political color fails to predict the votes of the representatives, the effects of the personal economic background and the character of the constituencies become statistically much more robust than before (table 4). To explain these findings we need to point to the discussions on corn tariffs in the years immediately preceding 1857, when corn prices were extremely high (figure 1). The protectionists had based their demands for agricultural protection on the idea of justice, and not so much on any economic theory. 47 The leader of the protectionists during the 1850s, the Catholic Barthélemy Dumortier, was very explicit that he and his partisans always wanted to defend that part of the population that was suffering. During periods of high prices they wanted to protect the consumers with free imports and an export prohibition. Conversely, when prices were low and farmers would not receive the price they considered just, the protectionists wanted protectionist measures for the agricultural sector. By using this rhetoric Dumortier hoped to reinstate the sliding scale of 1834. and allowed a significant number of representatives to follow their personal economic interest and the interests of their constituency.
Interpretation of the unanimous 1873 vote
In 1873 all remaining agricultural tariffs were removed. All representatives irrespective of their party affiliation or constituency now voted for free trade (leaving 3 abstentions in 1873 outside the analysis). After the 1850 vote, previous oppositions are on the wane. Table 6 shows that our strongest 1834  7  0  11  24  0  3  1845  9  0  21  36  0  4  1850  10  3  45  9  6  7  1857  12  7  19  16  10  22  1873  0  2  21  0  1  43 It is tempting to point to the previously mentioned rising share of the industrial sector in GDP.
However, industrialization cannot explain the universal preference for free trade by 1873 because it was geographically concentrated in five or six constituencies, leaving some agricultural constituencies untouched until the last quarter of the century. In other districts, industrialization did occur, but remained limited to some islands in an immense agricultural sea. 49 Nor did the agricultural structure change much between 1850 and 1873: it remained largely traditional until 1880, when the agricultural invasion and the introduction of new technologies started a very slow transformation process that was only completed after World War II.
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What, then, can explain these changes? As many authors have argued for British Repeal, other factors outside interest based approaches have to be looked at. Here the econometric analysis needs to be supplemented once more with a qualitative analysis of the Parliamentary discussions and the press. Most importantly, we discuss the relationship of ideas to interests with reference to the votes over agricultural trade liberalization. By 1873 almost every representative, regardless of personal interest, party and constituency, was in favor of free trade. We cannot accept the proposition that all representatives voted against the perceived interests of themselves or their constituency. 51 Therefore,
we must conclude that their perception of these interests had changed. All representatives came to think that free trade was to their advantage and (more importantly) to the advantage of their constituency. This is a radically different approach from British research that makes a distinction between interests and ideas. In Belgium we see ideas driving a shift in the perception of interests.
How did opinion shift? Like McLean and Bustani did for the UK, we argue that in Belgium, the subsistence crisis of 1845-1848 played a part in shaking up the old ideas. Previously Belgium, and 59 These economists aimed to eliminate all protectionist measures for agricultural and industrial products, and tried to forge ad hoc coalitions with agriculturalists, industrialists and the chambers of commerce to put pressure on the government.
The opinion that Belgium was confronted with a structural shortage in food production became more difficult to deny for the protectionists when the new subsistence crisis of 1853-1857 again pushed prices to worrying heights (see figure 1) . Food rioters once more attacked bakeries, corn merchants, and market places in large and provincial cities. 60 The influential Société Centrale d'Agriculture, which became free trade oriented in the second half of the 1850s, confirmed the structural character of the shortage in food production in 1854: "A sad truth, a truth full of menaces, is experienced by the people everyday. No one contests it, it is officially recognized. What the economists, who were thought to be theorists and dreamers, had dared to proclaim, is now proved by governmental statistics: the increase of the production of foodstuffs remains behind the increase of the population." 61 The most thorough analysis of the situation with references to the works of British political economists was written in 1855 by Edouard Ducpétiaux, a Catholic social scientist and general inspector of the Belgian charitable institutions. Like Quetelet, he was a member of the Central Statistical Commission that organized the censuses in 1846. He estimated the average shortage in wheat production to be about one tenth of the harvest. 62 More and more representatives came to believe that the subsistence crisis had become endemic and that Belgian agriculture did not produce enough food, even in the case of good harvests, to feed the growing population. 63 In 1855
Prime Minister Pieter De Decker acknowledged this as a fact. 64 The defense of protectionist corn tariffs became a difficult task in these circumstances, since free traders could depict tariffs as an unacceptable taxation on an already dear primary product.
The awareness of the structural shortage in corn production, British Repeal, the actions of the Belgian economists and the strategic move of De Decker opened the way for free agricultural trade in Belgium. In the 1860s front-rank economists confirmed that the option for free trade had been the best policy choice for Belgium. Auguste Orts, a Liberal representative and professor of political economy at the University of Brussels, told his students that "The absolute liberty of trade has brought the results you can observe today". 65 Emile de Laveleye, professor of political economy at the University of Liège, wrote that economic facts had proved that free trade was productive of prosperity. The British example was telling in his mind. 66 The example of the UK was ubiquitous in Belgium in these years. The journal L'Économiste belge contended that British agriculture had become the best in the world thanks to economic freedom. 67 The prominence of the British economy was also explicitly present in Parliament: "If England, which in the past recognized our superiority, has surpassed us today, this is because for a long time she has rejected the old doctrine of Protection and Subsidies." 
Conclusion
It proves to be difficult to use models based on narrow economic interests to explain the step to free trade in corn in the middle of the nineteenth century. British Repeal of 1846 is a notorious example.
Political scientists and economists studying Repeal have had a hard time making their models fit.
Many authors pointed to other factors influencing Repeal: ideas, institutions and political strategy.
Only Schonhardt-Bailey has succeeded in explaining Repeal using economic models of decisionmaking. But in order to make her interpretation of 1846 work, Schonhardt-Bailey had to acknowledge that the Corn Laws had survived votes in the immediate years before 1846 because of conservative ideology.
The Belgian case adds to the evidence that interest based explanations of the liberalization of corn trade should not be taken at face value. The corn tariffs were a hotly debated issue in Belgian Parliament in the first three decades after independence. During these long discussions a protectionist policy was instated in 1834 and tightened in 1845. In 1850, after the subsistence crisis, the sliding scale was abolished. In 1857 the tariffs for corn were lowered to a purely "fiscal" level. After 1857, the discussions subsided and by 1873 all representatives had come to accept agricultural free trade.
We conducted an econometric analysis of the roll-call votes on these tariff laws. Using biographical material and the 1846 censuses, we were able to construct detailed variables to measure the influence of party affiliation, personal pecuniary interests and the economic characteristics of the constituencies. Following international political studies we think it is difficult to separate ideas from interests. An interest cannot always be simply deduced from social-economic facts, without references to the ideas the actor holds of his place within the economy. As complexity of modern society rises, rational agents do not possess all necessary information, and so interests are not self-evident. One needs an interpretative framework that guides self-interest. The long research perspective of this paper allows us to document that the interpretation of interests changed after 1857, leading to the unanimous 1873-vote. The economic characteristics of most of the constituencies did not change radically between the highpoint of the discussions on corn tariffs (1834-1857) and the moment of the complete liberalization of these tariffs in 1873. It was therefore a shift in opinion underlying interests that needs to be taken into account. o gen voterel7=100*voters47/population o gen voterel8=100*voter48/population
